When More is Better-Design Principles for Prediction Markets in Defense Acquisition Cost Forecasting by Aggarwal, Taroon et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2012-02-01
When More is Better-Design Principles for
Prediction Markets in Defense Acquisition Cost Forecasting
Aggarwal, Taroon; Valerdi, Ricardo; Potoski, Matthew
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/54561
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
 
When More is Better-Design Principles for 













Lean Advancement Initiative 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
tar_agg@mit.edu 
 
Dr. Ricardo Valerdi 
Research Associate 
Lean Advancement Initiative 
Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development 




Dr. Matthew Potoski 
Public Policy and Administration 
Department of Political Science 























This research is supported by the Acquisition Research Program in the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. We also wish to thank Dr. Keith Snider 
for his efforts on behalf of the Acquisition Research Program. 
Special thanks to MITRE for extending their support and time, and for providing some useful 
information on prediction markets.  






ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
 
 
Taroon Aggarwal is a graduate student at MIT, doing his Masters in Systems Design 
and Management. He is also working as a research assistant at MIT Lean Advancement Initiative 
(LAI). His research interests lie in areas of cost estimation, software engineering and application 
of collective intelligence tools to large organizations. Prior to his graduate studies, he worked for 
around five years as an IT consultant in the financial services domain. Taroon also holds a 
bachelors degree in engineering from India. 
 
Ricardo Valerdi, Ph.D., is a Research Associate at MIT. He received his doctoral degree 
in systems engineering from USC in 2005, where he developed the COSYSMO model for 
systems engineering cost estimation. He is also a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at the 
Aerospace Corporation. Prior to his doctoral studies, Dr. Valerdi was a systems engineer at 
Motorola Radio Network Solutions Group.  He served on the INCOSE Board of Directors as 
Treasurer and is co-Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Enterprise Transformation. 
 
Matthew Potoski is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at 
Iowa State University where he teaches courses on public management and policy.  He has 
received Iowa State University LAS awards for Early and Mid-Career Achievement in 
Research.  He is Co-Editor of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management and the 
International Public Management Journal.  Dr. Potoski’s research investigates public 
management and policy in domestic and international contexts, including public sector 
contracting and service delivery, environmental policy, and voluntary regulations.  He is co-
author with Aseem Prakash of the Voluntary Environmentalists (Cambridge, 2006) and Co-
Editor of Voluntary Programs: A Club Theory Approach (MIT).  Dr. Potoski received a Ph.D. in 
Political Science from Indiana University in 1998 and a bachelor’s degree in Government from 











This paper discusses the applicability of prediction markets in Defense Acquisition projects, specifically 
in estimating their cost and schedule.  
Several temporal and political factors can sometimes limit the effectiveness of traditional methods of 
project tracking and cost estimation, which may be overcome by using prediction markets. A prediction 
market provides an environment for traders to buy and sell contracts whose values are tied to uncertain 
future events. Efficient prediction markets have been shown to outperform available polls and other 
forecasting mechanisms.   
There are various prediction markets based on different models and algorithms. Our focus is not to 
analyze these models, but to identify the design principles of implementing a proven prediction market 
model in a defense acquisition project. Some pilot studies have been carried out that provide insight into 
the behavior of the market participants. We found increased involvement of participants and greater 
interest in the projects to be major benefits. The areas that need to be considered in the design and 
implementation of markets are related to the participants (like, which traders to include), the information 
to be collected or the stocks, the marketplace to be used and the incentive structure to keep the 




Historically, defense programs for weapons acquisition have taken longer, cost more and delivered fewer 
quantities and capabilities than planned. (GAO, 2006) 
Some of the reasons for such discrepancies include: 
 Lack of discipline in estimation: sometimes all the required factors or experienced people are not 
consulted during the estimation process. There is also a lack of transparency and accountability 
(GAO, 2006) 
 Unrealistic expectations: The estimates can sometimes be too optimistic.(GAO, 2008) 
 Initial estimates tend to “anchor” expectations (Aranda, 2005): Initial figures of estimates set too 
high expectations from the start which is difficult to meet later on. Also, it is later on difficult to 
incorporate any modifications. 
 
A recent study by RAND involved an analysis of data in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for a 
sample of 68 completed programs. The results showed that the average cost growth (including both cost 
overruns and cost under runs) for these programs was 46 percent over the baseline estimate made at 
Milestone B and 16 percent over the baseline estimate at Milestone C. While cost growth occurred earlier 
in acquisition projects, the development cost growth at completion for programs initiated in 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s remained relatively steady. (Arena, 2007) 
  
It is also worthwhile to note that of the 23 programs assessed in the GAO report (GAO, 2006), around 10 
are expecting development cost overruns greater than 30% or have delayed the delivery of initial 
operational capability by at least 1 year. The impact of such conditions is the reduction in the value of the 
DOD’s defense dollars and lower return on investment (ROI) (GAO, 2006). See Appendix – Table 1 for 
more details. 
 
The key recommendation for the executive action from the report is to ensure that appropriate knowledge 
is captured and used at critical junctures, specifically at the following key points: 
 Program start 
 Design review for transitioning from system integration to system demonstration 





An effective way to capture knowledge and utilize collective intelligence of all team members is to use 
Prediction Markets or Information Aggregation markets. Such a market can be used as a supplement to 
existing estimation methodologies in generating more accurate cost and schedule estimates. 
 
PREDICTION MARKETS: HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
 
Prediction Markets are emerging as a promising forecasting mechanism for efficiently handling the 
dynamic aggregation of dispersed information among various agents (Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2007). 
Various terms such as ‘information markets’, ‘decision markets’, ‘electronic markets’ and ‘virtual 
markets’ can be used to describe this. In essence, Prediction Markets are speculative markets created for 
the purpose of predicting outcome of an uncertain future event. They provide an environment for traders 
to buy and sell contracts whose values are tied to uncertain future events. 
In the late 80s, some academics at University of Iowa’s business school came up with idea of giving 
students hands-on experience in trading markets, such as stock and commodities. Instead of using play 
money, they created a real market in which anyone could bet modest sums on outcome of future events- 
e.g. the next president of the United States. The Iowa Electronics Markets (IEM) is now a thriving 
nonprofit enterprise. (Tetlock, 2006) 
The figure below shows a sample prediction market that is commercially available (intrade.com, 2009): 
 
 (intrade.com) 
Figure 1. A sample prediction market 
 
The theoretical foundations of Prediction Markets lie in the efficient market hypothesis, which states that 
a sufficient number of marginal traders with rational expectations, who maximize utility through 
maximizing profits, drive prices in the market in such a way that there is no opportunity for arbitrage 
(Shvarts, 2007). 
It is believed that if the market is well functioning, contract prices reflect the collective wisdom of market 
participants. There are three primary types of prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004): 
 Winner Takes All Market: In this, the contract pays a specified amount if and only if the world 
achieves some specific conditions, with the price of the contract reflecting the market’s 
assessment of the probability of that occurrence. 
 Index Market: In this, contract pays an amount reflected in some condition of the world, such as 
the percentage of the vote a candidate receives or the inches of cumulative snowfall in a city. 
 Spread Market: In this, contracts specify the cutoff that determines whether an event occurs (such 
as win margins in football).  These basic contract types can be extended to generate additional 
predictions and measures of market uncertainty, such as the probability that a candidate will 
receive 40% percent of the vote, 50%, 60% etc 
 






Table I. Types of Prediction Markets (Adapted from (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004)) 
 
 
Prediction markets are most notably used today for predicting election outcomes, movie box office 
returns, terrorist attacks and sporting events (Zitzewitz, 2004). Information markets have also been 
deployed at Hewlett-Packard Corporation for making sales forecasts, and were found to be more effective 
than traditional methods. “Not only did the market predictions consistently beat the official HP forecasts; 
the outcomes predicted are consistent with the probabilistic predictions of the IAM (Information 
Aggregation Market).” (Plott, 2002)  
Google also launched an internal prediction market in April 2005. The Google markets are similar to 
Iowa Electronic Markets, and have survey questions like “How many users will Gmail have?” Common 
type of markets included those forecasting demand. (Masse, 2008) “Google’s prediction markets 
are reasonably efficient, but did exhibit four specific biases: an overpricing of favorites, short aversion, 
optimism, and an under-pricing of extreme outcomes. New employees and inexperienced traders appear 
to suffer more from these biases, and as market participants gained experience over the course of our 
sample period, the biases become less pronounced.” (Masse, 2008) 
 
Some of the factors that are involved in Prediction Market are: 
 Illiquidity: Prediction requires enough buyers and sellers making enough transactions to produce 
a clear market price that summarizes the market prediction.  In “thin” markets where buyer, 
sellers and their trades are few, the prediction market can sometimes be ineffective. Some 
research suggests prediction markets can be effective with as few as sixteen active traders 
(Christiansen, 2007). 
 Rationality: While prediction markets have been strikingly accurate when they meet the criteria 
for effective markets, scholars have noted some deviations from “perfect” rationality.  First, while 
traders’ preferences may bias their trades, such as when partisans buy political futures contracts 
for their favored candidate (Forsythe, 1999), the prediction market price of contracts will remain 
accurate so long as the enough marginal traders remain objective (e.g., their profit motives 
outweigh their preferences).   Prediction markets do not require all traders be rational as long as 
marginal market exchange is motivated by rational traders (Gruca, 2007), (Tziralis &. 
Tatsiopoulos, 2007). Second, as in horse racing, prediction markets participants exhibit over price 
long shots (so that contract holders receives a smaller payoff relative to the true probability of the 
event occurring) and under price high probability events, though (Cowgill et al., 2009) suggest 
the precisely the opposite biases occurred when Google employees traded in internal company 
prediction markets forecasting Google’s future.  Moreover, prediction markets may be less 
effective at accurately predicting extremely likely or unlikely events (Zitzewitz, 2004) 
 Manipulation and Bubbles: A sufficiently endowed and motivated trader might attempt to 





elected office, for example, might purchase contracts on himself to generate apparent momentum 
and publicity.  Speculative bubbles are possible in prediction markets, a non-trivial concern in 
light of recent macroeconomic events.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) propose that a speculative 
bubble occurred in political prediction markets on whether Hillary Clinton would win the 2004 
Democratic presidential primary, and bubbles may have occurred in experimental prediction 
markets reported in Plott and Sunder (1988).  To some extent, markets may self correct 
manipulation and bubbles (Strumpf, 2004).  The best defense against manipulation is sufficient 
liquidity so that profit seeking traders, recognizing that the manipulated market prices are 
inaccurate trade for contracts to bring predictions back into line.   
 
PREDICTION MARKETS FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROJECTS 
 
The DOD’s ability to meet its acquisition targets is becoming increasingly critical as defense budgets are 
reduced and expectations to deliver on time and on budget remain high. Costs overruns are one aspect of 
this issue. Please refer to table in Appendix – Table 2 for a sample of cost overruns in large federal 
projects. 
A recent GAO report (Edwards, 2009) concluded that “weapon programs are taking longer, costing more 
and delivering fewer capabilities than originally planned.” It also noted that “systematic problems both at 
the strategic and at the program level” (GAO, 2008) were to blame. The GAO also noted that military 
branches “overpromise capabilities and underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and 
sustain development programs.” (GAO, 2008) 
In 2008, GAO reviewed cost and schedule of 72 weapons programs and found that the average cost 
overrun for systems development was 40% (GAO, 2008) and concluded that “DOD’s acquisition 
outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal” (GAO, 2008). A study by Deloitte consulting also agrees that 
defense cost overruns are getting worse. (Irwin, 2009)  
 
The table below gives a brief comparison between existing cost estimation techniques and the prediction 
markets. The goal here is to compare the probable shortcomings of the former, with the possible 
advantages of the latter. 
 
Table II. Value propositions of Prediction Markets 
Probable limitations of existing cost methods Possible value propositions of Prediction 
Markets 
• Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) 
based on technical factors rather than 
programmatic “soft” factors. 
• Shift of focus from estimating by 
individuals to groups. 
 
• Not dynamically updated as a program 
evolves, making the original estimate 
outdated as soon as the climate changes. 
• Provide way to leverage information from 
diverse sources. 
 
• Manifestation of a few decision makers, 
under tremendous time pressure, working 
with limited and perhaps biased 
information. 
• Mitigate biases stemming from pressure to 
‘price to win’ or hide damaging 
information. 
 
 • Enable frequent sampling of information. 
 • Incentivize traders to seek out quality 
information that will help them do better. 
 
Prediction markets are a judgmental forecasting method (Graefe, 2009) where the price mechanism of the 
market automatically aggregates all the dispersed information among participants. Various aspects of the 





DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF PREDICTION MARKETS  
 
As with any markets, prediction markets may fail – and produce inaccurate forecasts – if not properly 
designed and executed. They should follow specific mechanisms, contracts and contexts to ensure 
participants are adequately incentivized to participate. 
Some other factors to be incorporated are (Suda, 2009): 
• Should require unbiased tacit knowledge of crowd 
•  Should be designed in well- incentivized environments 
•  Should be designed for a non – hierarchical environment 
•  Generally not suitable for idea generation process 
•  Should have well defined end dates or closing criteria 
•  Choices should be mutually exclusive and have a definitive  outcome  
 
PILOT STUDIES ON PREDICTION MARKETS 
 
In order to study the prediction markets, we conducted some simulations on a group of students at MIT to 
study the effectiveness of prediction markets, and some interesting observations were noted. Details of the 
study are given below: 
 
Pilot Study 1: Predicting ratings for Sunday Night Football 
 
A group of 17 participants (N=17) were asked to participate in a private marketplace for predicting the 
Nielsen Rating (NBC – USA) for Sunday Night Football (Oct 25). Please refer to Appendix – Figure 1, 2, 
3 for the screenshots of the market. The following rules were set in place: 
• Time duration for trading was 5 days, with the market set to close 30 minutes prior to game start. 
• Each participant allotted an initial amount of $5000 for trading (play money). 
•  Winning Criteria was generating maximum worth.  
•  Incentive – Points for class participation grade and a popular book for winner. 
•  Minimum of four trades per person (tied to the incentive of class grade), with no maximum limit 
on trading. 
•  11 rating ranges were present as choices or contracts for participants to trade on, with each rating 
range being assigned equal probability (9.09% each) to start with (See Figure 2). 
• Participants could ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ shares of the choice or contract they found most likely to occur. 
Every time a user bought a share for a particular idea, the price went up. Similarly, each time 
users sold a share, the price went down. The User’s account was also credited or debited based on 
his/her choice. 
• There was a direct correlation between price and probability – share price of $9.09 indicated 
9.09% chance of that particular rating range. 
• The buy and sell transactions were managed by an automatic market maker. 
 
Results: 
Around 236 trades were conducted in total by 17 participants.  
The highest rating range predicted was of (9.6-10) with a 19% likelihood prediction, followed by range 







Figure 2. The stocks in the prediction market 
 
The actual rating range turned out to be (9.1 – 9.5)  
 
Figure 3. Results at the close of prediction market 
 
A Probability distribution function (Pdf) for the result is shown in Figure 4, which demonstrates how 







Figure 4. Pdf of the prediction market results 
 
Although market predicted range was close, there can be two reasons why the market forecast was not 
absolutely accurate: 
 On the day of the game, a World Series game ran into overtime – overlapping with the football 
game and impacted the expected ratings for the Sunday night football. It turns out that there were 
no baseball fans in the participating traders, and hence this information was not captured. 
 In a study on markets on NFL football games from tradesports.com, there was an observation of 
mispricing (Solomon, 2008) visible primarily in sporting markets. This was due to a behavioral 
bias known as disposition effect, which is the tendency of investors to sell stocks which have 
risen in value and hold on to stocks that have fallen in value, with the objective of earning 
maximum profit. Thus there might be mispricing in such scenarios and the hypothesis that the 
prices in prediction markets reveal unbiased estimates of true probabilities of the event happening 
might not be true.  
 
Pilot Study 2: Predicting ratings for Monday Night Football 
 
Based on the previous pilot study feedback, the structure of the next market was modified. The 
participants (N=13) were asked to predict the Nielsen Rating (Cable TV - US) for Monday Night Football 
on ESPN .Instead of providing range choices to participants for bidding, they were asked to bid on an 
indexed market. Rules were similar to the last market, except for the following changes: 
 Instead of ranges, participants now saw only one rating. They had to predict if the rating as per 
their opinion was to be higher or lower. Based on their responses, the price or rating was adjusted 
automatically. 
 The initial rating set was 10. 
 The price and rating scale was 1:1, i.e. a price of $10.00 meant the current projected value of 
rating was 10.00 (See Figure 5). 
Results: 
Around 116 trades were conducted by 13 participants. The final rating predicted by the market was 10.00 










Figure 6. Graph showing change in value of the stock upon trading 
 
There was a huge variation in the ratings predicted, with the highest value being 33.1 and the lowest value 
being 0.6 
The actual rating turned out to be 7.7 which were different from the market value. The major reason for 
this was that market place was too volatile. A single participant could buy a large number of shares, and 




Behavioral observations of Participants: 
The participants comprised a mix of people with football knowledge and others with no knowledge at all. 
The actual result of the rating was quite close to the rating range that the test market predicted. But the 
main benefit was observed in the behavior of the participants. An unbiased, incentivized market piqued 
their interest and motivated them to remain involved throughout the market duration. Some other 
observations were: 
 Increased participation due to Internal competition 





 Trying to make use of First mover advantages 
 Forming alliances to manipulate the market 
 High incentive to participate led participants to gain more knowledge on the subject. 
 Use of statistical models by some participants to forecast ratings 
 
Other useful insights from pilot studies for implementing prediction markets: 
 Ensure enough liquidity: Research done on prediction markets (Christiansen, 2007) suggests at 
least 16 participants for an effective market. Based on the two pilot studies, the number of 
participants was lesser in the second study potentially explaining the volatility and resulting 
significant error in the prediction. 
 Avoid volatility by choosing the right scale for trading in market: The market needs to be less 
volatile, so that it is not easily influenced by a single trader. 
 Ease of Use: The Prediction market should be easy to use, as many participants were initially 
reluctant to trade due to perceived complexity. 
 Ensure regular information update: In both the studies, there were not enough ‘happenings’ 
regarding the game ratings, during the trading duration to sustain participants’ interest. The 
market is expected to fare even better is some new knowledge is available throughout the trading 
duration. 
 Leads to increased awareness and interest: A significant contribution of prediction markets in the 
field of cost or schedule estimation is to keep the participants involved and make the process 
exciting. Traders with no knowledge of football got involved by researching more on the subject. 
 Align incentives with the participants’ interests: Some people just executed the minimum 
required four trades and stopped. Although there was high trading, some people did not care to do 
all the research. One reason for this was due to incentives not aligning directly with the objectives 
of these participants. 
 
DESIGNING PREDICTION MARKETS FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROJECTS 
 
There are various components of a market that need to be considered prior to designing and implementing 
a prediction market for a project. A prediction market is composed of the following: 
 Stocks: These are the outcomes or possibilities of the market that are collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive. These act as stocks and securities for the traders to trade against, with a ‘buy’ 
indicating a belief of occurrence of that particular outcome and a ‘sell’ indicating a belief of non-
occurrence. 
 Marketplace: This refers to the software environment which contains the market or the questions 
for trading. It also encompasses the market manager which facilitates trades among the traders 
and manages the information distribution process.  
 Traders: These are the participants or team members in a project that will be trading information 
in the form of stocks in the market. 
 





There needs to be a continuous flow of information for the traders to base their decisions on and trade 
throughout the market duration. 
Incentive structure is another important factor that should be considered during market design, as it acts 
as the motivating factor for the traders. 
 
The success of the project hinges on identifying an acquisition program willing to participate. The ideal 
characteristics of the program are: 
 uncertain cost and schedule components that can be specified clearly in a contract 
 a sufficiently large program community to ensure a liquid market 
 ample “soft” relative to “hard” information and information is broadly and unevenly held by 
diverse actors 
 one-of-a-kind program or a program with limited relevant historical information 
 susceptible to performance impacts as a result of external events (i.e., political landscape, policy 
changes, personnel attrition, technology maturity, design modifications) 
Based on initial pre-screening, we identified ‘Shallow Water Combat Submersible’ (SWCS) as a suitable 
project, with a plan to implement the prediction market for duration of 3-6 months. 
 
Below is some of the discussion on the design components for the prediction market: 
 
1) Stocks: the stocks or the outcomes traded in the prediction market form the most important 
component of the market. The stocks traded will give us an indication of the beliefs of the participants, 
and the number of stocks traded will show us the level of confidence in their beliefs.  
Hence the questions that are asked in the market are very important. 
There are mainly two categories of questions that can be asked: 
 Type I questions: Asking these questions can directly provide the required information. Q1 A 
 Type II questions: Asking these questions can indirectly provide the required information, and a 
series of questions might be required for getting the information directly. Q2  Q’  Q’’  A 
 
This is similar to another perspective, as per which the state of the world can be divided on basis of two 
dimensions (Healy and Ledyard, 2009). Some questions can based on an unobservable factor whose value 
can impact realization in second dimension, e.g. the underlying monetary policy of a central bank .While 
some questions can be based on a directly observable factor e.g. Interest rate each quarter. 
The latter type of questions correspond to Type I questions, while the former compare to Type II 
questions. 
 
Handling Type II questions: 
The distinction of questions based on these categories is important because these allow us to focus more 
carefully on the ‘stocks’ or outcomes of Type II questions, so that the required information is available.  
 The suitable approach with the Type II questions is to ask multiple questions in the first round of 
prediction market, and subsequently drill down to specific questions in further rounds. 
 If we consider a single question as a single market, then one of the approaches can be to run 
multiple markets at a given time, and then to add follow-up questions based on the responses. 
New markets (i.e. questions) can be run every week, and old questions can be updated weekly 
based on new information. The important factor with this approach is to decide which questions 
need to be deployed first. 
 
Designing questions for the market: 
There is a lot of information that can prove useful in case of a defense acquisition project. This 





related to the current or future decision processes within the project. Based on the type of information 
required, we have further categorized the market questions: 
 Questions of the First Order: These are the questions that give us the information about the 
program of interest. Some examples of questions for the pilot project are: 
o Will SWCS be certified by August 1, 2010? 
o The cost of the first unit will be $x. 
o The final cost of the program will exceed the baseline estimate by x%. 
 Questions of the Second Order: These are the questions that give us the information about traders 
and the trading process. For the pilot project, some of the questions are: 
o What is your motivation for trading? (e.g. to win/ to solve the problem/ to validate my 
knowledge) 
o What is your role in the Organization? 
o What are useful sources of information about the project? 
 Questions of the Third Order: These questions give us information of the behavior outside of the 
prediction markets. Some of the questions are: 
o How have you used the prediction market in your job?  If you notice a change in a 
contract price, how have you used that information?  
o Did trading improve your confidence in your opinion? 
o Did Prediction Markets encourage you to change your communication habits? 
 
The first order questions will be asked in the prediction market for trading. The second order and third 
order questions are more of profiling questions which can help decide how to improve the markets, or 
how the participants are gaining from the market information. These questions can be sent to the 
participants as a survey and can be tied to incentives so as to encourage them to participate. Incentive can 
be additional bonus money (like, Earn $100 more (of play money) for answering 5 questions) 
The above factors helped to shortlist some of the questions to be used in the prediction market for the 
pilot defense project (SWCS). A risk mapping, showing the risk covered by a specific question of the first 
order, along with the modified version of the question is shown below. Note that the first four questions 
are of type I, while the last question is of Type II. 






Another important aspect is to mix some fun questions (like who will win the Monday night game, etc) 
along with serious questions to keep the participants involved. 
 
 Marketplace: There are two important aspects of design for the marketplace – the software 
environment in which the participants perform trades, and the market manager which facilitates the 
trading process. 
 
Considerations for the Software Environment: 
Following are the design considerations for the software environment, based on observed behaviors in 
pilot simulations and requirements for a defense environment: 
 The software environment will be easy to access and use. 
 The software environment will be commercially available, with prior success in defense related 
environment. 
 The environment will satisfy the IT security considerations – like secure login, user access rights, 
data security etc. 
 The software environment will have dashboard and administrative capabilities to analyze the data 
and generate reports based on the user behavior. 
 It will be possible to share new information with the traders and/or close or open new markets 
whenever required. 
 
Considerations for the Market Manager: 
The matching mechanism in prediction markets has most often been a continuous double auction in which 
computer software matches buyers offering bids with sellers and their asking prices. Prediction markets 
have been successful using real world money, purely “play money” with no economic value (beyond the 
satisfaction of “winning), and “prize money” that can be exchanged for prizes and entries in prize 
drawings. We will establish a prediction markets with play and prize money and will establish contracts 
for the cost and duration of particular features of the acquisition program. This is more realistic than 
focusing on the entire program completion given the limited time we have to run the market. Fully 
specified, clear and enforceable contracts in prediction markets require the future state of the world (or 
events) on which the contracts can be easily adjudicated. 
Market Scoring Rule invented by Professor Robin Hanson at George Mason University will be used in 
the Prediction Market. This will ensure that fewer traders can be present in the market, and lot of concepts 
related to stock markets that are difficult to understand (like bid-ask spreads etc) can be avoided (Siegel, 
2010). The price of the stock represents whatever the last trader was willing to pay for shares and is set 
automatically according to the volume and sentiment in the question. For example, if someone buys 10 
shares of an answer, the price of the share will be increased automatically according to an algorithm. 
To ensure sufficient liquidity, we will use a prediction market with automated market maker, which 
means that the buying and selling of stocks will happen between traders and the market and not between 
the traders themselves. 
 
 Traders: While prediction markets require some disagreement among potential traders over forecast, 
(else no trades would occur) excessive information heterogeneity can be harmful to the markets 
functioning. If some traders posses significant private information (and hence become insiders), the 
outsiders may refuse to participate, ultimately killing the market. Prediction markets are most likely to be 
successful if traders hold sufficiently balanced information about the event but have differing beliefs 
about the meaning of common information. It is also critical that when new information becomes 
available, it will be widely known.  
We will recruit market participants from those employed in the Acquisition program or those surrounding 
the Acquisition program (i.e., subcontractors, end users, consultants).The traders in the defense project 





people in a project who will have limited information as to what is going on with a program at large, and 
they might be biased to their individual projects.  Hence, it will be ensured that participants from all 
smaller projects, as well as people from other departments are included in the trading process. The 
acquisition project will have sufficiently broad following to attract participants from inside and outside 
the government. These can include administrative personnel, sub-contracts, engineers, end users, 
consultants etc. The markets will be implemented for duration of 3 to 6 months, giving ample trading time 
to the participants. 
Sometime, due to fear of hierarchy or work environment pressures, people do not reveal uncomfortable 
information related to the project. In the prediction market, anonymity of traders will be maintained so 
that they can disclose useful information without hesitation.  
 
 Incentives: The incentive structure is perhaps the most important component of prediction market in 
the DOD environment. Incentives should be such that they are non-biased and encourage participation 
independent of any hierarchical considerations. “As with any business incentive system, a considerable 
challenge exists in choosing incentives that motivate the right behavior. . . With information markets, 
incentives must serve a dual role: to motivate participation and to motivate participants to provide truth-
revealing opinions. Incentives that satisfy both criteria can be difficult to define.” (LaComb, et al., 2007).  
Performance based incentives in the project can be provided in various ways. For example, participants 
can be rewarded based on the portfolio value at the closure of the market. Awards can also be given to the 
most active traders, or the traders contributing the most valuable information. 
Non-monetary awards can be as effective as monetary awards when used as incentives. For example, 
Google found that in their internal markets, participants cared more about non-cash prizes like T-Shirts 
rather than cash prizes (Coles,Lakhani and McAfee, 2007). Similarly, by announcing user rankings, the 
play-money markets in Christiansen’s field experiment (Christiansen, 2007) were successful even without 
monetary incentives. 
Other factors like social competition, recognition and opportunity to contribute towards the project can 
also act as important motivating factors. 
 
For the pilot defense acquisition project, we feel the following incentives will encourage participation: 
 Declaring winners based on the maximum portfolio value at market closure. 
 Maintaining a leadership board displaying the top players. 





In his book The Wisdom of Crowds James Surowiecki (2004) argued that if we take a crowd of diverse 
people and correctly aggregate their judgments, we will be able to get more accurate results based on the 
collective intelligence of the crowd. This wisdom of crowds can be seen in action every day 
(Coles,Lakhani and McAfee, 2007) with the collective intelligence also driving Wall Street – the 
probabilities generated from the market displayed through the stock prices. 
The prediction markets can be implemented for defense acquisition projects to aggregate the dispersed 
information across different functional areas. This information can help keep track of any cost or schedule 
variances, and also identify any potential risks that can impact the project. We anticipate prediction 
markets can outperform existing Defense Acquisition estimation techniques (i.e., parametric, analogy, 
activity-based (Boehm, et al. 2005)) in cases where there is ample “soft” relative to “hard” information 
and information is broadly and unevenly held by diverse actors. 
Markets need to be compatible with the political and regulatory contexts in which they operate. For 
example, federal regulations permit play and prize money prediction markets but have restricted real 





prediction markets (Hanson, 2007) which collapsed from a political firestorm over the (quite illogical) 
proposition that terrorists might benefit from trading in terrorism futures. 
 
Based on the various case studies and literature available on prediction markets, our observations through 
simulations of markets, and discussion on various aspects of defense acquisition projects, we consider the 
following design principles: 
 
 The acquisition project should have sufficiently broad following to attract participants from inside 
and outside the government. These can include sub-contracts, end users, consultants etc. 
 Although play money should be used for participation in the markets, the traders can be 
incentivized based on their constant participation and ability to predict accurate results.  
 Ample historical data should be available on similar projects, so that participants who are new to 
the project have some basis of gaining knowledge and predicting. 
 The questions for the market should be very carefully designed so that the required information 
can be revealed. ‘Fun’ questions should be mixed with ‘hard’ questions so that the participants 
remain involved. 
 To ensure sufficient liquidity, prediction markets with automated market makers should be used, 
and at least 15-16 participants should be targeted for trading (Christiansen, 2007). 
 Results of the prediction markets should be carefully studied and reported as part of regular status 
reports.  
 Anonymity of participants with respect to responses should be maintained to encourage 
information-sharing. 
 The length of the market and closure of each specific question need to be given proper 
consideration while designing the market. The support of senior management in Defense projects 
is essential for starting the prediction market. 
 Markets need to be compatible with the political and regulatory contexts in which they operate. 
 
As part of the ongoing research project, the observations and feedback from preliminary and literature 
research will be used to run the field trial with the DoD (Department of Defense) acquisition programs for 
a fixed duration (up to 6 months). The prediction market for the selected pilot acquisition project still 
needs to be implemented, and other design and implementation factors will be added or the current ones 
revised based on new information.  
If prediction markets improve in forecasts in the defense arena, as they do in other venues, our aim will be 
to assist in implementing and then studying additional markets, including those over the longer term and a 
wider variety of programs. It is clear from our research that a significant contribution of prediction 
markets in the field of cost or schedule estimation is to keep the participants involved and make the 
process exciting. Used with right implementation guidelines, these markets can prove to be helpful in 



















Table 1: Development Cost Overruns by Decade 
 
 (GAO, 2006) 
 
Table 2: Sampling of Federal Cost Overruns 
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